(XIX.) THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS. 
Three questions arise as to the relation of the Council of Ephesus to the Roman see.
(1) What was the nature of the authority exercised by Celestine I. when he commissioned Cyril to act for him in the case of Nestorius? (2) When the Council was summoned, did this commission "devolve" (as Mr. Rivington maintains) upon it? (3) When it met, did it (as Mr. Rivington holds) act as Celestine's instrument and minister?
(1) It was in the summer of 430 that Cyril wrote a synodical letter to Celestine, giving an account of the Nestorian controversy up to that date. "Long-standing usages of the Church,"
he says, "induce him to communicate the facts to Celestine;" he feels that he "must needs" do so, although heretofore he has not written on the subject either to Celestine or to any other of their "fellow-ministers" - a phrase which shows that in this connection he regards the bishop of Rome as a primns inter pares, and, having resolved to warn the episcopate at large, begins naturally with him. He will not separate himself from the communion of Nestorius until he has thus informed Celestine, whom, therefore, he requests tupwsai to dokoun.  Mr. Rivington understands this as an application for a final judicial decision which "the Pope alone" could give. The Latin translation of Cyril's letter simply renders, "quid hic sentias praescribere "  and this is supported by what follows, for Cyril tells Celestine that he ought to make known his mind (skopon) to the Macedonian and the Oriental bishops. We shall presently see that the Oriental bishops did not regard Celestine as the one supreme judge of
such a question. Celestine summons a Council at Rome, and in its behalf replies to Cyril; he calls it "a great triumph for his belief that Cyril adduces such strong proof in support of it." Is this the language of a Pope who, as Mr. Rivington words it, "at once assumes his infallibility"? He desires Cyril to take a certain line of action as his representative. But here Mr. Rivington objects to the rendering of an important clause as "join the authority of our see to your own" (p. 313). He substitutes "assuming the authority of our see" (p. 309). But a man who had no official authority might "assume the authority" of one who appoints him a plenipotentiary, as a Pope might make a mere deacon his legate; and the words, as read by Cyril in Greek, are "the authority of our see having been combined (sunafqeishs) with yours," so as to recognise in Cyril an authority with which Celestine's was to be linked.  Cyril is told to "act authoritatively as taking Celestine's place."  But Celestine proceeds to say that
unless Nestorius, "within ten days after receiving his admonition," gives written assurance of agreement with the faith of the Roman and Alexandrian Churches, and of all Christians in general, Cyril is to "provide for" the Church of Constantinople, and Nestorius is to know that he is separated from "our body." Nestorius is similarly warned that in that case he must regard himself as "ejected from all communion with the Catholic Church."  Celestine writes in a like sense to the orthodox at Constantinople;  and to John, patriarch of Antioch, he writes that this sentence had been uttered by himself "or rather by Christ" (a phrase used also in the letter to Cyril), and that Nestorius, on failing to give satisfaction, will be in the position of one "removed from the assembly of bishops." Mr. Rivington treats this language as expressing a fully Papal "assumption of infallibility."  But Celestine here lays stress on the complete doctrinal accord between Cyril and himself; he is certain that what they
thus hold is the very truth revealed in Christ he confidently assumes that it is this, and nothing else, which all Churches hold; and he infers that all Churches will agree with Rome and Alexandria in excommunicating a bishop who denies it. This is further illustrated by Cyril's letter to John of Antioch, written after he had received the commission of Celestine.  On Mr. Rivington's showing, Cyril knew that he and any other bishop must absolutely bow to Celestine's judgment as being, because his, the judgment of Christ delivered through His vicar. If he held this, we know how he must have written to John. How, then, does he write? Does he say, in effect "You and I, of course, must obey the bishop of Rome as our sovereign ruler and our infallible guide"? Nothing like it. He says: "A clear direction has been given" (using the word tetupwke) "by the holy synod of the Romans" (so above, "the pious bishops who were found in the great city of Rome"), "whom it is necessary for those to follow (peiqesqai) who cling to communion with the whole West." He adds that "they have written to Rufus of Thessalonica, and to some other Macedonian bishops, who always concur
tais par' autou yhfois and also to Juvenal of Aelia [Jerusalem]. It is then for your Piety to consider what is expedient; for we shall follow the decisions given" ... [here Mr. Rivington proceeds] "by him," meaning Celestine, and the Greek text has par' autou; but this is clearly an iteration, by oversight, of the previous par' autou, for the context requires par' autwn, and so the Latin version has "quae illi judicaverunt," and Cyril adds, "fearing to fall away from the communion," not (as Mr. Rivington renders) "'of such'"(i.e. "the whole West")' but "of so many." It is necessary to insist on this, because Mr. Rivington (p. 315) misrepresents the passage as recognising an "ex cathedra judgment on a matter of faith" in the sense of the Vatican decree. Now let us ask whether it is conceivable that a patriarch of Alexandria (that is, of a Church very closely associated with Rome), if he held what that decree affirms to be of faith, could sink the obligation of obeying Christ's Vicar in the "expediency" of keeping on good terms with "the whole West;"  or whether, if he
thought the "Roman synod" the mere "apparatus, machinery, or setting,"  of one man s sovereign "judgment," he would thus have put the instrument for the causa efficiens. Next, let us look at John's letter to his friend Nestorius. On Vaticanist principles, they both knew that Celestine as Pope had a "plenary, ordinary, and immediate" jurisdiction over them and their Churches; that, in a word, he was their pastor and their sovereign, and that to resist him was sheer rebellion against the Divine "Bishop of souls." Now, when John would persuade Nestorius to accept "Theotocos" within the term (short, he says, but long enough) prescribed by "my lord Celestine" ( o kurios mou being a familiar title of respect), does he appeal to any such relation between the Constantinopolitan see and the Roman? By no means. His argument is: We of the East have just got rid of the trouble caused by dissension with the West;  if you stand stiffly out against the adoption of a word which is really orthodox, "the West, and Egypt, and perhaps Macedonia," will again be in formal separation from the East. There
is not a word in the letter which can be interpreted in the Papalist sense. 
(2) There was, we are told, "no limitation in point of time in respect of" the commission given by Celestine to Cyril (p. 322). How can this be, when it expressly specifies "ten days" as the period within which Nestorius is to retract on pain of immediate excommunication? Cyril himself not less expressly refers to the "period" thus assigned;  he describes himself as "acting in conjunction with the holy synod assembled at Rome under the presidency of his brother and fellow-minister Celestine" (words which Mr. Rivington neglects) when he gives the third (and evidently the final) warning, "Unless you adopt the right faith" (i.e. within ten days) "know that you have no part with us nor any
place among God's priests and bishops." Is he not regarding himself as fulfilling the charge contained in Celestine's letter, and announcing the Roman and Alexandrian ultimatum? True, he had also been instructed, in such case, to provide a new bishop for Constantinople. But this was impracticable; and what Cyril could do, that he did. Mr. Rivington struggles to make out that the commission was not "exhausted" by his action (p. 322), but survived to pass on to the Council as summoned by Theodosius. But a commission cannot be at once fulfilled and unfulfilled. If it is fulfilled as far as is possible, it is necessarily "exhausted." If the recipient is to take further action, he must get a new commission. So stood matters at the close of 430; Nestorius had not simply ignored the requirement pressed upon him; he had met Cyril's twelve articles by counter-anathematisms of his own. Ht was therefore, by the very terms of the commission, ipso facto excluded from the communion of Rome and Alexandria. But Theodosius, under his prompting, had summoned a General Council to meet in Ephesus at the ensuing Pentecost. In the letter of invitation, he had ruled
that "no new steps should in the interim be taken by any individuals,"  and by this, as Tillemont puts it, he had "arrested, in effect the decrees of the Council of Rome." The action, then, of Celestine in August, and of Cyril about the end of October was suspended by the emperor's act which cut straight across the lines of their policy. Indeed, the very raison d'etre of a General Council was to bring on the stage a fuller authority than that of one or of two patriarchs. Naturally, they were disappointed; naturally, they tried to minimise the effect of the citation, and to think of the arrangements of August as still somehow inchoate. But in such a case facts must outweigh words; and if Celestine, according to Mr. Rivington, "virtually owned the commission originally given as still running," or if Cyril thought that "he was but continuing on the ground of the original commission," we can only say that no one can alter the grammatical scope of his own once published words. The vox missa, in that sense, will not "return" for his convenience. As for Mr. Rivington's assertion that the Council was summoned with Celestine's "consent" (p. 318), he consented
in that he made the best of the situation. But does any one imagine that Theodosius asked his leave before issuing a peremptory citation? 
(3) The Council met in June, 431.  Cyril presided, partly as bishop of Alexandria, partly as "managing the place of Celcstine," just as Flavian of Philippi "occupied the place" of Rufus. Was he, then, commissioned to represent Celestine at the Council? "It is difficult," as Tillemont tersely remarks (xiv. 393), "to see how the commission of August 430 could extend to enabling him to act for Celestine at the Council which was not summoned until November;" and Celestine, when writing to Cyril on May 7th , had said nothing of any such delegation, nor had he instructed his actual legates to treat Cyril as their chief; but only to take counsel with him.  However, Cyril was
not likely to be punctilious in such a matter, and "might well assume that Celestine would not disavow him on that head."  Now let us look at the conduct of the bishops assembled. Did they regard themselves as simply Celestine's agents for the carrying out of his previous sentence against a heretic? This must have been their view if, however erroneously, they had regarded the commission of August as "devolving" upon them. They would then have had one, and only one, question to ask: Had Nestorius, at the expiration of his term of grace, given satisfaction to Cyril, and therefore to
Celestine? Five minutes would have sufficed for proving that he had done the very contrary; and then the Council would have promulgated the Papal sentence as already "irreversible" and as having de jure taken effect against Nestorius months before, and [would - NF] have proceeded to take measures for the filling up of the Constantinopolitan see as having thus de jure become vacant. Instead of this, the assembled prelates spent a whole midsummer day, even until dark,  in going through the whole mass of pertinent evidence, after repeated formal citations calling on "the most religious bishop Nestorius to present himself among them."  Even after his third refusal they did not at once condemn him for contumacy: they tested Cyril's second letter to Nestorius, which Celestine had approved, by the Creed of Nicaea; but whereas, on Papalist principles, they should have treated Celestine's letter to Cyril as decisive, they heard it without remark;
and again, whereas, on that showing, they should have put in the very forefront Cyril's third lettes as conveying the Papal ultimatum, they only listened to it and abstained from giving it an express synodical approval. Instead of simply accepting Cyril's and Celestine's estimate of the language used by Nestorius, and treating it as already proved to be heretical, they professedly inquired whether his letter to Cyril was, like Cyril's own letter, "in accordance with what was put forth by the holy Fathers at Nicaea;" they condemned it as "wholly contrary" to that standard, and to Cyril's second letter; they heard evidence as to his recent reiterations of heresy; they read seventeen extracts from approved theologians; they went through twenty passages from the sermons of Nestorius; and then, at last they pronounced his condemnations.  Before we come to it, let
us notice Mr. Rivington's remark: "It was St. Celestine's expressed desire that they should satisfy themselves as to the heterodoxy of Nestorius," and so "should give to his judgment a rational adhesion."  If this was his "desire," it was beyond the scope of the commission on which, according to Mr. Rivington, they were acting; and no "desire" of his was made known to them until the arrival of the legates - that is, nineteen days after the memorable 22nd of June. Mr. Rivington exults over one clause in the Council's sentence against Nestorius, which he renders, "necessarily compelled by the canons and by the letter of our most holy father and fellow-minister,  Celestine" (p. 334). It is not
"necessarily compelled," but "necessarily" or "irresistibly urged" or "impelled;"  but let that pass. In the missives to Nestorius himself and to his clergy, the Council mentions the canons and not Celestine. The canons, and Celestine's letter to Nestorius, cannot here be treated as coordinate; for the Council had not rendered literal obedience to that letter; its [the letter's - NF] purport was broadly inconsistent with any laborious examination of the opinions of the man whom he had therein branded as a "wolf." The words, then, cannot be strained into meaning that "the compulsory nature of the" previous "Papal decision was presumed" by the synodical sentence, which "added nothing to its intrinsic authority;" they simply indicate that the
bishops desired to utilise to the utmost the fact that the greatest see in the Church  was on their side, as against the bishop of the Eastern capital, who was understood to be patronised by the court, and to have many sympathisers in the Antiochene patriarchate - the "Orient" technically so called. They would be the more disposed to do this because they had been obliged to act without waiting for Celestine's envoys. And when, on July 11th, these "legates" appeared in the Council, they brought a letter from Celestine  which requires rather more comment than is given in Mr. Rivington's text; but in one of his Appendices he returns to it, and urges that, although the Pope speaks of the Apostolic teachership as having "descended in common to all bishops" ("haec ad omnes in commune Domini sacerdotes mandatae praedicationis cura pervenit"), he does not say that it has descended to them "equally" (p. 480). We ask in reply: Where does he say that it has come to him in a unique sense, as
the teacher of the Church Universal? Where does he differentiate his own share of the "teachership" from that of other successors of the Twelve? Where does he distinguish his own position from theirs, as the "priest's" is distinguished from the "people's" in "common prayer"? (p. 482). Mr. Rivington, indeed, pretends that Celestine identifies his relation to the bishops with that of St. Paul to Timothy (p. 339).  This is a peculiarly audacious gloss. What Celestine says is: "We must act by labouring in common, that we may preserve what has been entrusted [to us], and hitherto retained per apostolicam successionem  For this is now required of us, to
walk according to the Apostle. ... We must take up spiritual arms. ... The blessed Apostle Paul admonishes all who are now stationed in the place where he ordered Timothy to remain. ... The same place, then, the same cause, even now requires that very duty. ... Let us, also, now do and aim at that which Timothy undertook as incumbent on him, 'ne quis aliter sentiat' [referring to 1. Tim. i.3,4].  Let us be of one mind, ... since the faith which is one is being struck at," etc.
Is not Fleury warranted in saying that Celestine here "places himself in the rank of the bishops"? It is true that he refers at the end
to what he had "previously ordained" as to be "carried out" by his three legates; and there is also a difficulty as to the text of the final clause, where the Latin "Id quod agitur" is not in accordance with the Greek oper an gnwte. 
Let us now see what follows. The successor of St. Basil acknowledges that Celestine's "Apostolical see had previously given a direction,  and that they had followed and carried it out;" but he immediately adds, "by pronouncing against Nestorius a canonical and Apostolical judgment."  The bishop of Ancyra then said that Celestine's letter was a divinely given proof of the justness of their decision. But why? Because it showed his "zeal for the divine faith."  In the next session, one of
the legates, more Romano, refers to our Lord's words to St. Peter, and affirms that the Apostle "up to this time and always lives and exercises judgment in his successors;  another speaks of himself and his brethren as sent by Celestine to "execute" his resolves. But what says Cyril himself? He takes care (a) to describe the legates as representing, not only "the Apostolical see," but "all the holy synod of the bishops of the West,"  and (b) to distinguish their action, as Celestine's real "agents," from the sentence already pronounced by the synod to which he requests their "assent" in writing. But does he, then, recognise them as giving the supreme sanction without which the act would not be properly valid? Not a word like this appears in his speech. But Mr. Rivington fastens on the subsequent declaration of the bishops that the legates had spoken akolouqws (Lat. consentanea). "It is enough," he exclaims; "we ought ... to hear no such accusations as to Rome's disregard for history as are indulged
in by some writers, whose position is absolutely excluded by the history of the Council of Ephesus. ... The teaching of the Vatican decree on this subject [the Church's government] was the teaching of the Fathers of Ephesus, and it was the rule of their conduct" (p. 347). Was it so, indeed? We need not repeat the terms of the decree; but does this declaration commit the Council to everything which a Roman envoy might say about the dignity of his master? Does not the context show that the Council was referring to the legates' agreement with its decisions? If we render the word "suitably," this would be the ground of the "suitableness" or consistency. One of them had just said that they were "bound to affirm [or "confirm"] the council's teaching,  according to what had been done in it" (that is, in view of its recorded proceedings): then comes the remark, "Since they have spoken akolouqws, it follows that they should make good their own promise, and affirm [or "confirm"] what has been done by their signatures;" whereupon they sign the minutes, one of them as "entirely assenting to
(ecakolouqwn) the last judgment of this holy and oecumenical synod." Their language would thus be "appropriate as emphasising" their "solidarity" with the synod on the one great question which it had to decide. The word bebaiow is somewhat elastic; its sense in any particular passage must be settled by the context; and we learn by Cyril's phrase, "canonical assent," in what sense the legates were expected to "confirm" the council's proceedings. We need only add that in the synodical letters to Theodosius, Celestine is "commended for having condemned the heresy before our sentence" (yhfou), and the legates are said to represent both him and "the whole synod of the West."  As to any notion of obedience in the Papalist sense being due to Celestine from the "ecumenical Council," there is not a single word. We may well say with Bossuet that at the outset, "Ipsa synodus intellexit omnia ipso jure in suspenso esse, atque ex synodi pendere sententia;" and that, in the proceedings, the Council so acted as to show that Celestine's judgment was not regarded as "ultimum atque irreformabile."
But this, which Bossuet denies, is what his
Church now affirms to have been acknowledged from the first. Mr. Rivington placidly assumes that when Cyril in the fourth session spoke of the Council as having had the task of "confirming the right definition of the Apostolic faith," he meant, "of course, the orisqenta tupon of" Celestine. But Celestine's "direction" was not a definition of the faith; and a little more acquaintance with ancient dogmatic phraseology would have saved Mr. Rivington from this blunder. Just before the Creed was read, in the first session, the purpose in hand was stated by Juvenal - "to establish the right faith,"  i.e. as formulated by the Nicene Council. This faith, or rather Creed, was to be confirmed, not as any bishop's teaching could be confirmed, but in the sense of being synodically reaffirmed; and so, when the African primate's letter  had been read, it was summarised by Cyril as aiming at the "confirmation of the ancient doctrines of the faith;" and in his great letter to John he writes, "We cannot allow
the Nicene Creed to be unsettled."  The Council, too, in its letter to Celestine, speaks of Nestorius' error as "dislodging from its basis the economy of the mystery." Mr. Rivington cites this letter for the sake of two remarks in it, that the Council felt it a matter of "necessary duty to report to Celestine all its proceedings" - which, considering his eminent position, was natural enough - and that although it might "justly and lawfully" have deposed John, it had "reserved his case for Celestine's judgment" (p. 353). And here is an illustration of Mr. Rivington's "ways." He makes the Council give as its reason for this reservation, that "the matter concerned one of the 'greater thrones,'" a phrase taken from a subsequent paragraph relating (as he himself intimates) to a different point;  he glosses the assertion of a right to depose John, as if it depended
on the presence of Roman legates; and he omits the reason actually assigned for not doing so - "that by forbearance we might overcome his temerity." Once more, he assumes that three Cyprian bishops spoke untruly when they claimed a traditional independence of Antioch;  and he affirms this with a positiveness which contrasts with the language of such great scholars as Tillemont and Le Quien. His reason is, that Innocent I. had pronounced "that the Cyprians ought to return to their obedience." But Innocent's letter avowedly proceeds upon an ex parte statement;  and how, on Vatican principles, could a General Council, even provisionally, reverse the alleged "decision" of a Pope? He pours scorn on the suggestion that there may have been some connection between the African bishops' deprecation - in that previous letter to Celestine which he wishes to represent as spurious - of acts which would introduce into the Church "the smoky arrogance of the world," and the Ephesine resolution re Cyprus, forbidding
bishops to usurp jurisdiction beyond their own bounds, "lest under the guise of episcopal action there should creep in the arrogance of [worldly] authority." The resemblance is almost a verbal identity; it seems to demand some explanation. Eastern bishops, about ninety years before, had shown some jealousy of Roman self-assertion; is it incredible that Eastern bishops in 431 should have thought the words opportune in case of its recurrence?  The greatest Asiatic bishop of the fourth century had complained of the "haughty bearing" of that same Roman bishop [Damasus - NF] whose accession, compromised by sanguinary conflicts, had given occasion to a Pagan historian to dwell sarcastically on the pomp and wealth which made his
see an object of ambition.  Eastern prelates were often shrewd and acute men, and certainly not simple enough to think the occupants of "the first see," as such, inaccessible to the temptation of domineering; and such of them as were alive some fourteen years later would probably feel that their words had been unconsciously prophetic of Leo I's attempt to subjugate the Church of Gaul by the aid of an imperial rescript, containing language which, as Tillemont says, "does little honour" to his memory. 
 It is a pleasure to agree entirely with Mr. Rivington (p. 305) as to the vital importance of the doctrine secured at Ephesus. But he might as well have brought out more clearly the difference between a "substantial" and an "accidental" union. The one secures our Lord's personal Divinity, the other reduces Him to a pre-eminent saint. This was, in fact, the issue raised.
 Mansi, iv. 1016.
 Our author, more suo, reiterates his gloss on tupwsai and tupos, and infers from such terms that Celestine resumes in himself the apostolic government of the Christian Church," etc. (p. 315). Of course, therefore,he renders kataciwson by "deign;" but see the word as used in Mansi, iv. 1057, for "be so good as," "think proper," etc. Cf. Basil, Ep. 68.
 Mansi, iv. 1020. Mr. Rivington says that "there is nothing in the Latin or Greek exactly corresponding to 'his own'" (i.e. Cyril's). He quotes soi, but leaves out sunafqeishs. The Latin, it is true, has "adscita."
 Th hmetera tou topou diadoxh ep' ecousia xrhsamenos. Here diadoxh of course implies a delegation.
 Mansi, iv. 1036.
 This letter has a beautiful passage on St. Athanasius, followed by a truly Christian reminder as to that everlasting country" of which no exile in this world can deprive Christ's servants.
 Here he criticises Dean Church (p. 312).
 Mansi, loc. cit.
 So, after the council of Ephesus was concluded, its members wrote to the emperors, "The synod which has the whole West, with your great Rome and the apostolic see, sunedreuousan, and all Africa and all Illyricum" (Mansi, iv. 1433).
 See Rivington, p. 428; and v. supr. p. 57.
 Honorius had described the deputation on behalf of St. Chrysostom as representing "our West."
 Mr. Rivington is not quite satisfied with its "tone," but considers that it "urges obedience." Certainly it does not, in the sense which he requires. He also refers to ton orisqenta tupon in Cyril's letter to Juvenal of Jerusalem. But Cyril there gives his reason for sending on Celestine's letter, "to stir up your zeal ... and that we may with one heart ... save our imperilled flocks" (Mansi, iv. 1060).
 Thn orisqeisan proqesmian, Ep. ad Nest. 3.2. It is quite arbitrary to say that "the very terms of the commission implied its continuance beyond that period. Mr. Rivington says, as if he had read it in black and white, that "the pontiff had left the execution of his sentence, including its delay (if deemed advisable), to the synod" (p. 336). When, and in what words? It was Cyril who had to "execute" it.
 Mansi, iv. 1113; Tillemont, xiv. 364.
 Mr. Rivington is following Baronius, Ann. v. 732: whom Tillemont dryly criticises, xiv. 759.
 That Cyril did act impatiently as to the opening, see "Waymarks in Church History," p. 150 ff. John's message "not to wait" must be read with his letter to Cyril.
 Mansi, iv. 556. In a courteously written article in the "Dublin Review" for April, 1895, Mr. Rivington infers from Celestine's letter to Cyril "that he did mean Cyril to be president." The letter neither says nor implies this. Next we are referred to the council's letter to the emperor as saying "that Celestine sent Cyril to supply his place." If Mr. Rivington had quoted the words (Mansi, iv. 1301) it would have been plain that they relate to the commission of August, 430. "Even before this holy synod was convened, Celestine commissioned Cyril to occupy his place" (i.e. in proposing an ultimatum to Nestorius), "and now by another letter he has made this plain to the synod." But the letter here referred to does not name Cyril at all; it does name the three Roman envoys. What, then, is meant by "this"? We have to look back to the earlier sentences of the synodical letter: "this," in the sentence first naming Celestine, expressly refers to the function of all bishops in the exclusion of false doctrine.
 Mr. Rivington makes a difficulty about Cyril's proposal that a "second" imperial decree should be read, beside the letter of citation dated November 19, 430, on the ground that it directed the bishops to take up the question of doctrine "without any delay." This "second decree" was the letter in Mansi, iv. 1117, which, however, merely ruled that the question of doctrine should take precedence of others.
 They were escorted home with lights (Mansi, iv. 1241).
 Sunedreusai is used on the first occasion (Mansi, iv. 1132). Probably, had he come, he would have had a seat in the midst, as Dioscorus had at Chalcedon. But until his deposition by the council, "he was treated as bishop of Constantinople, the Roman council's decree notwithstanding" (Tillemont, xiv. 364). He is called "most religious" until the general "exclamation" against him in Mansi (iv. 1177), and even once afterwards.
 Mansi, iv. 1169-1212. "He was deposed, not by virtue of the pope's judgment, which had been read, but on the proofs which were given of his false teaching" (Tillemont, loc.cit.). "Celestine," says Mr. Rivington, "considered himself as, in a peculiar sense, clothed with apostolic authority which he could exercise, as we have seen, in the way of deposing the bishop of Constantinople" (p. 480). But the council deposed that bishop; it could not, therefore, have recognised "apostolic authority" as having already done so. The Dublin Review represents it as having only taken the most "deliberate method" of "carrying out the papal judgment." But as "we have seen," if that judgment was binding on the council, Nestorius was a deposed heretic at the end of 430, whereas the council begins by treating him as still dans ses droits. Before it opened, his friend Acacius had dealt with him as not yet irreclaimable.
 So in the Dublin Review he defines the relation between pope and council in "catholic theology." The council is indeed morally bound to agree with whatever the pope has decided as to doctrine: but it is not to be his unintelligent tool; it is to "judge," i.e. to satisfy itself as to the grounds of the papal decision, and thereby to give a peculiarly "striking character" to the sole infallible judgment. This is all! Did bishops who travelled to ancient councils know this "theology"?
 Mr. Rivingtnn takes the first of these two titles in a distinctively papal sense; and the second, he imagines, means only that Celestine and the bishops were alike in priesthood! Of course it is here used for ''fellow-bishop" (supra, pp. 119, 145). Leitourgia is frequently used for the "ministry" of a bishop (see Euseb. ii. 24, iii. 13). In the Acts of Ephesus the title of archbishop is given six times to Celestine, seventy-six times to Cyril. To assume that, when bishops call Cyril "holy father," as they do fifty-five times in the first session, it is as Celestine's delegate, is to ignore the Eastern usus loquendi. Any "primate" would be so called. See, too, other cases in Mansi, vi. 1055 ff.; vii. 265, 493.
 Anagkaiws katepeixqentes See Liddell and Scott on this verb and on epeigw. If we are to be rigorously literalistic as to this apofasis, we must suppose that the bishops actually "wept much" while passing it. On anagkaiws, cf. Mansi, iv. 1240, 1301 (letters to the emperor).
 If Rome is spoken of at Ephesus as "the apostolic see," is this, as Mr. Rivington thinks, "a point of tremendous significance"? The bishops would not care to magnify Antioch by emphasising its apostolic character, and Jerusalem was still subordinate to Caesarea.
 Mansi, iv. 1283.
 In his "Dublin" article Mr. Rivington still maintains this, and says that by "we" and "us" Celestine in that passage means the council: "He is speaking as occupant of the see of St. Peter and St. Paul, and they occupy the place of St. Timothy the bishop of Ephesus." This is paltry. Celestine supposes himself to be present by his envoys at Ephesus. He never even alludes to his own see as that of Peter's. He never claims any sole apostolic authority. Still less does he, as the Review represents him, exhort the council to "execute the sentence passed ... by the apostolic see."
 He had said before, "Sanctum est ... concilium, in quo utique nunc apostolorum frequentissimae illius quam legimus congregationis aspicienda reverentia est. Nunquam his defuit Magister ... docebat qui dixerat quid docerent ... qui in apostolis suis se confirmat audiri ... Haec ad omnes," etc. "Haereditario in hanc solicitudinem jure constringimur [i.e. all bishops] quicunque ... eorum vice nomen Domini praedicamus, dum illis dicitur, 'Ite, docete omnes gentes.' Advertere debet vestra fraternitas quia accepimus generale mandatum ... Subeamus omnes eorum labores, quibus omnes successimus in honore," etc. So afterwards: "Quae fuit apostolorum petitio deprecantium? Nempe ut acciperent 'verbum Dei loqui cum fiducia' ... Et vestro nunc sancto conventui quid est aliud postulandum," etc.
 Eccl. Hist. xxv. c. 47. Mr. Rivington refers to the bishops' acclamations "to Celestine, the guardian of the faith!" Literalism consistently applied to such language would produce curious results. Compare the greetings addressed to an emperor in the sixth session of Chalcedon; e.g. "O teacher of the faith!" (Mansi, vii. 177). When the council applies to Celestine and Cyril alike the title of "a new Paul," Mr. Rivington is sure that Cyril was viewed simply as Celestine's representative; and when it hails Celestine as tw omoyuxw ths sunodou, this is turned round, as it were, to mean that the council's "judgment" was but "an intelligent adhesion to the papal sentence" ! (p. 339).
 A various reading of the Greek agrees with the Latin.
 Tupon. The word yhfon, "sentence," precedes.
 Firmus, Ap. Mansi, iv. 1288. Bossuet: "Sic exsequitur synodus generalis primae sedis sententiam legitima cognitione et inquisitione, nec simplicis mandatarii vice, sed canonico et apostolico dato judicio" (Def. Decl. vii. 13. Mr. Rivington (who seems to think that the Defensio is not wholly Bossuet's) does, in fact, reduce the "general council" to the position of a dignified and intelligent "mandatarius" of the Pope. With Celestine's letter fresh in memory, a Cappadocian primate was hardly likely to mean that all "apostolical" authority was concentrated in Rome.
 Both in his book and in his article, Mr. Rivington quotes Theodotus without giving this reason for his assertion.
 Mansi, iv. 5295. Mr. Rivington says that "East and West, at Ephesus, agreed in" this (p. 371). So, again, he assumes that "the East to a man believed" what a legate said about "Peter judging in his successors" (p. 382). The notion that Easterns believed whatever they heard and did not contradict shows a curious lack of humour.
 Thus "the West" was not absorbed into Rome.
 This must be the sense of eautwn didaskalias, leg. autwn, Lat. "eorum doctrinam." [textual emendation by Dr. Bright - NF] The Latin must be of primary authority in a "legate's" speech. Mansi, iv. 1299.
 Mansi, iv. 1240, 1301, 1433, 1461.
 A like phrase had been used still earlier (Mansi, iv. 1133).
 Mr. Rivington summarises this letter (p. 317) as saying that "the bishops of Africa have accepted the decision of the holy see," yet quotes it fairly as referring also to "the judgment of the bishops agreeing together" as against Pelagianism.
 Cyr. Op. ed. P. E. Pusey, vi. 50. Compare with kratunqhnai (Cyril's phrase), Mansi, iv. 1344, that "the synod decreed kratein ... thn pistin" and on oron, Cyr. adv. Nest. i. 5, "the symbol which the Nicene fathers wrisanto" and cf. Mansi, iv. 1361, and Socr. i. 37, etc.
 The excommunication directed against Cyril and Memnon by John of Antioch and his supporters (Mansi, iv. 1336). "For if persons are left free to insult the greater thrones" (or "sees") confusion will follow. Thus the council means to include Ephesus, as well as Alexandria and Antioch, among sees of this class.
 One of them said: "They cannot prove that from the apostles' times he of Antioeh, or any other, ever imparted to our island the grace of ordination" (Mansi, iv. 1468).
 "Cyprios sane asseris ... Quocirca persuademus eis," etc. (Innocent to Alexander of Antioch; Mansi, iii. 1055.
 Cf. Ath. Apol. c. Ari. 25. In page 359, referring to "Dr. Bright's imagination," Mr. Rivington says, "he thinks that the Roman legates at Ephesus may have been absent from that particular session which dealt with the Cyprian case." And yet we read, in page 357; "This decision was probably arrived at after their [the legates'] withdrawal, and so was merely a provisional arrangement pending further inquiry," as if any resolution arrived at without their presence could of course be only tentative; whereas the decree is most absolute in its terms, and, by authority of "the holy and oecumenical synod," annuls any "direction" which may conflict with it. He also denies that Besulas, an African deacon, represented Africa at the council (p. 359). But at the end of the list of members we find, "Besulas deacon of Carthage." He represented his bishop Capreolus (Mansi, iv. 1128, 1208).
 Ammian. xxvii. 3.
 Valentinian III. was made to say (July 8, 445), "Since the primacy of the apostolic see has been confirmed by the merit of St. Peter, the dignity of the city of Rome, and also the authority of a sacred syned, ne quid praeter auctoritatem sedis istius inlicitum praesumptio attentare nitatur; for then will the peace of the churches everywhere be preserved, si rectorem suum agnoscat universitas." But neither the Sardican provisions, which Leo persists in referring to as Nicene (Epp. 43, 44), nor the Roman version of Nic. can. 6, would justify this inference, for which Leo must he held responsible. Valentinian was not likely to insist on having its validity established. The rescript orders that "whatever the authority of the apostolic see has directed, or shall direct, is to be law throughout the provinces," i.e. of the West. Yet Leo could write of another bishop, "Propria perdit qui indebita concupiscit" (Ep. 104. 3): a pregnant maxim, which sums up our case in regard to his own see. One ought, perhaps, to notice the argument that if the canons referred to had really been Sardican, Leo would have had "no reason for quoting them as Nicene, since, as Sardican, they would have been a sufficient authority for his purpose" in writing to the Eastern emperor. But (as Mr. Rivington himself says, in p. 468) the Sardican council was not known, in the East, to have put forth any canons; and in any case a Western synod could not have had as much "authority" as the Nicene, nor have suited Leo nearly so well. As is well known, he was bent on crushing Hilary of Arles, who had withstood him. Hilary may have dealt over-stringently with bishop Chelidonius: but the interest of the case lies not simply in his dignified firmness when protesting against the acceptance of Chelidonius' appeal, or threatened by Leo's entourage, or put under guard by Leo's despotic order, but rather in the ground taken by the prefect Auxiliaris as a peacemaker. He entreats Hilary - not to subnsit himself penitently to a spiritual sovereign whom he had affronted, but - to make some concession to "Roman sensitiveness" (cf. Honoratus, Vit. Hilar. c. 17). See Dr. Cazenove's signally equitable treatment of the case, in Dict. Chr. Biogr. iii. 70.