(XX.) THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON.
At last we come to the Fourth General Council. At the end of the trial of Eutyches in Flavian's Council of Constantinople (November, 448), it seems that, after the assembly broke up, the condemned abbot, in a low voice, appealed to certain foreign "synods." What were they? According to the "patrician" Florentius, to whom he had spoken, "the synods of Rome, and of Egypt, and of Jerusalem." 
Mr. Rivington ingeniously recasts this: "to an Egyptian and Jerusalemite, as well as to a Roman Council;" and then sets himself to minimise the reference to the two former, and, with regard to the latter, to sink the "Council" in the "Pope." We know nothing, he argues, of any letter from Eutyches, except the one to Leo: therefore, we may practically treat the application to Leo as standing alone (p. 366). This is a "short and easy method," indeed; but it happens that Eutyches, in 449, charged Flavian with ignoring his appeal to a General Council.  Then as to Leo's correspondence with Flavian; he naturally thought that Flavian "ought to have written" to him as soon as Eutyches did. Flavian's first letter was, in fact, somehow delayed, but in his second he gives a full account.  Mr. Rivington
grandiloquently describes him as "invoking St. Leo's prerogative;" acting as a "judge of first instance," and "bringing Eutyches before Leo" for a "final peremptory judgment;" and the heading of page 369 runs, "Flavian prefers a Papal Brief" - something, we presume, in the style of documents sealed with "the Fisherman's ring," and menacing the disobedient with the "indignation of Almighty God, and of His Apostles Peter and Paul." He makes the bishop of Constantinople say, "Deign to give your decision by means of briefs, in accordance with the canonical deposition of Eutyches" at Constantinople. How many of his readers will turn to the original? Those who do so will find Flavian in no such humble attitude; he says, "Be so good as to give assent,  by a letter of your own, to the deposition which has canonically taken place;" and he adds that nothing now is wanted save Leo's "impulse and assistance" to tell on the mind of Theodosius, and to stop the mischievous scheme for a new Council.  This is natural
on the theory of a precedency of position and influence; but no rotundity of phrase in a modern Papalist comment can puff it out into a recognition of Papal monarchy. Nor is there in the last paragraph of that famous and inestimable letter to Flavian, which is known as Leo's "Tome," anything like a claim of real supremacy; while, even had the language been stronger, the oecumenical acceptance of the Tome had reference to its magnificent exposition of the great doctrine on which Christianity is based.
In Leo's letter to the unhappy Council which he afterwards, with excusable exaggeration, branded as "a meeting of robbers," the object in view is described: "that all error may be done away with by a fuller judgment"  Mr. Rivington forthwith glosses: "the sentence of the Pope was to swell out and be completed by its synodical proclamation, as the sufferings of Christ are completed by those of His followers" (p. 377). By aid of this most gratuitous and
hardly reverent illustration, a Council intended to be oecumenical is degraded into a mere Papal consistory; and while Leo's account of the pledge given by Eutyches, "per omnia nostram se secuturum sententiam," is translated into a promise to obey the Holy See," the part to be taken by the Council is thus described: "His legates were to determine with the holy assembly of the episcopal brotherhood 'what things will be pleasing to the Lord.'" Is "with" here intended as an adequate representation of communi vobiscum sententia?
That Leo, alike in his high official position, and in his force of character and religious earnestness,  was the man to stand forward amid this Eutychian peril, will be admitted by all who believe in the One Christ as "perfect God and perfect Man," with gratitude due to him for that firm theological equipoise whereby, while the error of the time being is exposed, no advantage is given to its Nestorian opposite. He went much too far, we believe, in magnifying his own bishopric, by consolidating
and formulating the "Petrine" ideas which had long grown up among its clergy;  but let us not underrate the significance of his words when, in attempting to work upon the Eastern court for the redress of wrongs done by the "Latrocinium," he speaks as the mouthpiece of "omnes nostrarum partium ecclesiae, omnesque sacerdotes" (even as afterwards he speaks of writings of his as sent to Constantinople "non solum apostolicae sedis auctoritate, sed etiam sanctae synodi, quae ad nos frequens convenerat, unanimitate").  This, according to Mr. Rivington, refers merely to such bishops as happened to be in Rome, whose authority, when sitting with him in synod, was due to him alone - as if they were but a sort of cabinet council to the Sovereign of the entire Church. But Leo means Theodosius to understand that he has the Western Church at his back; one is reminded of Cyril's care to
insist that Celestine and his legates represent the Western hierarchy. It was on this occasion that he repeated the claim of Nicene authority for a Sardican canon; and if Zosimus and Boniface had made that claim in good faith, Leo made it in the face of evidence which had been in the possession of his Church for thirty years. Yet all the urgency of Leo,  supported by the Western emperor  and princesses, fails utterly with a pious but feeble prince bred up under the influences of Eastern Christianity.  Readers of Gibbon will recollect
his sly allusion to the "fortunate stumbling of the emperor's horse."  Theodosius dies; Pulcheria and her "nominal husband," Marcian, ascend the Eastern throne; and Marcian writes to Leo as having "oversight and rule in regard to the divine faith,"  and offers a new Council in which, sou auqentountos (Lat. te auctore) peace may be settled among Catholic bishops.  These phrases by no means warrant the gloss that at the future synod Leo's authority should be all-decisive; and in the correspondence which followed we see clearly that when Leo intimated that he did not want a new council, unless it was to be held in Italy, Marcian held to his resolution that a council should be held, and not in Italy, but near Constantinople. Leo had to make the best of it, though he did not conceal
his annoyance: he could not use Marcian as he had used the wretched Valentinian.  Even before Theodosius died, Leo had written to him about the new bishop of Constantinople, whom he had reason to regard with suspicion, and he wished his own Tome to be a test. Be it remembered that on Vatican principles, as Mr. Rivington expressly says (p. 415), the Tome "was already of faith." Yet Leo speaks here with remarkable moderation: Anatolius should study the Fathers' writings, and with them Cyril's letter to Nestorius, and the minutes of the Ephesian Council; and "let him not disdain to peruse my letter also, which he will find to be in full accord with the pious mind of the Fathers."  Can words be
plainer as against the assertion that the Tome, qua Leo's, was deemed infallible? No doubt as to the bishops who had yielded to the tyranny of Dioscorus, Leo commissions Anatolius to act with his envoys, and entrusts him with the carrying out of his dispositio  - a word which suggests to Mr. Rivington the parenthetical hint, "cf. the use of dispositio for an imperial edict," so that Leo may be thus represented as nothing less than a spiritual emperor; which, indeed, is the position in effect assigned by authentic Roman teaching to his present namesake.
At the opening of the Council of Chalcedon, the "legates" objected to the presence of Dioscorus. Let us hear our author: "The imperial commissioners wished to resist the decision of the legates [that he should have no seat in the Council], but in vain. They had to obey 'the head of all Churches,' and cause Dioscorus to
leave his place. His presence, however, was required, and he was therefore allowed to sit in the middle, without, that is to say, a seat as a constituent member, which was the gist of the legates' demand" (p. 401).
But Mr. Rivington omits (one is really weary of having so often to use this verb) the original insistence of the "legates," "Let him go out, or else we will go out;" and the remark of the commissioners, "If you represent a judge, you must not be an accuser as well." The arrangement come to was in the nature of a compromise;  but Dioscorus was treated as bishop of Alexandria until his final act of contumacy.  The title of Oecumenical Patriarch," employed in the Alexandrian petitions to Leo as president, and to the Council, was obviously put in to please Leo; and it must not be inferred from the Council's silence that such a phrase received its sanction,  or, indeed, that the memorialists
expected to be understood literally. Again, when Dioscorus is condemned, the dictum of the "legates," that Leo "by them and by the Council" deposed him, is to be read with the successive speeches of bishops.  Anatolius, who had his own reasons for wishing to stand well with Leo, professes to be "altogether of one
mind with the Apostolic see;" out of the other prelates, a few combine Leo's name with that of Anatolius; still fewer combine it with the Council's; a large number associate the names of both prelates with the Council's; one adds the name of the bishop of Antioch, but the great majority refer to the Council or "the fathers" simply. In the missives to Dioscorus and to his clergy, the sentence is grounded on his previous offences plus his contumacy towards the Council; and instead of accepting, even constructively, the position of being Leo's minister, the Council repeatedly describes the deposition as its own act.  No doubt, in the letter to the Emperor we read that Dioscorus might have been pardoned if he had not "barked against the Apostolic see itself, and attempted to excommunicate the Pope  Leo." But Mr. Rivington stops just short of the momentous
words, "He has been fittingly deprived of his episcopate by the Universal Council." 
And now as to the treatment of the Tome. The commissioners propose that the Council should frame a doctrinal formulary. This is objected to, on the ground of the Ephesian Council's "rule" against compiling "another Creed."  "We dare not make another exposition, for we have in writing those made by the Fathers" - meaning the Nicene and "Constantinopolitan" forms of the Creed,  to which the contmissioners had referred. One bishop remarks, however, that Eutychianism has required some new statements of truth, that Leo has given a "type" or formulary, and that "we follow him and have signed his letter," as,
indeed, many bishops had done before the Council met.  The bishops exclaim, "We all say this; the expositions given are sufficient; it is not lawful to make another." Clearly, "this" refers to what they had said before; and Mr. Rivington ought to have recognised that the "expositions" mean the Creed, and do not, as he imagines (p. 409), include the Tome, for the Ephesian "rule," which is referred to as an authority, would not have excluded any addition to documents like the Tome, which did not profess to be a Creed.  The Creed was read in both forms, followed by Cyril's two chief letters, and by the Tome, the last three documents being hailed with acclamations. But the subject was postponed until a subsequent session, when the Tome was solemnly accepted by the Council; but in what terms? The remark that the Council "no more sat in judgment on the Pope and St. Cyril, as superiors, than a man acts as
superior to St. James and St. Paul" when he propounds a "Harmonia Apostolica" (p. 411), is absolutely gratuitous. The Fourth Council did not "judge" of Cyril's teaching, because it had been solemnly adopted by the Third; but did it not, in any true sense, "judge" Leo's? Let us see. The bishops at Ephesus, in their individual affirmations, had approved of Cyril's teaching as expressed in his second letter to Nestorius, because (as many of them said) they "found," or "saw," or "recognised," or "understood," or "ascertained" it to be consonant to the Creed.  They thus "judged" it, and thereupon erected it into a standard. It was so regarded when Leo's Tome was dealt with at Chalcedon. Now, here are some of the phrases in which the bishops adhere to a document proceeding from the Roman chair, and, according to Mr. Rivington, "already irreversible," being "an ex-cathedra pronouncement,"  obligatory on all Christian consciences from the moment of its promulgation by Leo, simply because it was he who promulgated it: "I have ascertained - I judge -
I am fully persuaded - we find - we have found - that it is in accordance with the Creed," and, as many bithops add, "with the teaching of the Council of Ephesus" or "of Cyril." Or, "as far as I have been able to perceive," or "to understand, it agrees - I perceive that it no way differs - we have proved by examination that it no way differs - I find in it nothing divergent - I have found that it agrees - your Splendours [the commissioners] see that it agrees," etc.  Are we to say that such language implies a real "judgment" when applied to a writing of Cyril's, but, when applied to one of Leo's, means only that the speakers now appreciate the grounds of a teaching which, independently of such appreciation, had a divine right to their submissive acceptance? Nothing in the Acts could warrant a distinction prima facie so arbitrary. If words on a solemn occasion mean anything, here is a series of declarations in which individual bishops, members of the Oecumenical Council, accept the Tome because they personally believe it to be conformable to Church standards, just as their predecessors had dealt
with Cyril's letter; and thus by their act it acquires a place among Church standards.  The series in question, including the statements of those prelates who had found a few difficulties in the Tome (as if it tended to Nestorianism) and had been satisfied by explanations, extends (with the Latin rendering) over nearly thirty-seven columns of Mansi's seventh volume. Was it fair in Mr. Rivington to refrain from giving any samples of this language? One may ask another question: was it quite prudent? 
Coming to the "Definitio Fidel" as ultimately adopted by the Council, Mr. Rivington makes the commissioners "ask practically whether the bishops were prepared to withdraw themselves from the Supreme Pontiff" (p. 421). We need not say that there is nothing like "Supreme Pontiff" in the original, which reads, "from the most holy Leo," a title by no means, in those days, equivalent to the "Holy Father" among Romanists.  Our author has, indeed, a good right to emphasise the great service rendered by Leo's envoys in prevailing on the Council to substitute "in two natures" for the ambiguous
"of two natures," which at first stood in the "Definitio." But the commissioners, in giving full support to this request, relied, not on any "Papal prerogative," but on the argument from consistency. By accepting the Tome, which pointedly affirmed that "in the complete nature of very Man was born very God, whole in what was His own, and whole in what was ours," the Council had committed itself to "in."  And the "Definitio," as revised and promulgated, has nothing of Papalism in it, and classes the Tome with Cyril's letter, "inasmuch as it is accordant with Peter's confession."  Mr. Rivington mentions the address to Marcian, but slurs over a critical part of the case. The Council there defends the letter of "the admirable prelate of Rome" from the charge of "innovation" by precedents from earlier dogmatic letters, and then says, "If it is not accordant with the Scriptures, and with previous Fathers, and if it is not manifestly an advocacy of the Nicene creed, let them confute it." 
Theodoret's case is very unsatisfactorily treated by our author.  The injured bishop of Cyrrhos unquestionably uses the technical term epikaloumenw in this application for Leo's help, and undertakes to abide by Leo's judgment whatever it may be. But in the
letter to the Roman priest Renatus  (of whose death he was not aware), he hopes that the "archbishop" of Rome will bid him take refuge with "your council," and promises to accept what "you" (umwn) may decide. This "council," Mr. Rivington insists, would be the mere "machinery" of the purely "Papal judgment;" but in another letter Anatolius (a "patrician" to whom Theodoret wrote seven letters) is asked to obtain leave for Theodoret to "go to the West and be judged by the bishops who dwell in it;"  so that the Council was somehow to represent the Western Church, which a bishop wronged in the East would naturally wish to enlist on his side. As Theodoret must have expected, Leo, and doubtless some assembly of Westerns, pronounced in his favour. This, on Vaticanist principles, should have been amply sufficient to place him, as a matter of
course, among the constituent members of the Council of Chalcedon. But it was by no means deemed sufficient. The commissioners found that in face of strong opposition, he could only take his seat in the midst as a competent accuser capable also of being accused. He did not vote, "except on such business as was connected with his own justification," i.e. as was properly doctrinal.  In the eighth session he was called upon explicitly to anathematise Nestorius. Mr. Rivington (applying the Vatican "principles") thinks that this did not prejudice the previous Roman judgment, chiefly because "the legates" themselves "actually gave the" synodical "decision" in his favour (p. 432). But the fact remains that the bishops vehemently and persistently imposed on him a test which Leo had not imposed; that he tried to satisfy them by something short of it; that he was not pronounced "worthy of his see" until he submitted.  The "legates" did not "give the decision," but simply took the lead in giving a vote; six bishops followed, of whom five made no allusion referring to Leo's action, while a
sixth seems to include him among "archbishops;"  then all the prelates assented by acclamation, and the commissioners pronounced that Theodoret "should regain the Church of Cyrrhos, according to the judgment of the Council" - words not exhibited by our author. 
Lastly, as to the twenty-eighth canon. Mr. Rivington moralises (in a manner which suggests some reflections) on the "lust of power" which possessed the see of Constantinople. This passion, it seems, is, very "infectious in an imperial centre." Not at all, we suppose, in a centre which emperors had left open to bishops like Leo! But to proceed. "Constantinople," says out author, "wished to be in the East what Rome was as patriarch of the West. Patriarxias klhrousqe was St. Gregory of Nazianzus's condemnation of the East" (p. 440). The words, in one of his autobiographical poems, have nothing to do with technical patriarchates;
nor do they "condemn the East" at large: they refer (as Mr. Rivington would have seen had he looked them up) to ambitious prelates who wanted promotion to grander sees.  As for the "rebuffs which Constantinople had met with" at Chalcedon, the Council had not refused to call the "Sojourning Synod" a synod, but had simply blamed it for condemning a bishop unheard  and when it declined to sanction Constantinople's custom as to the consecration of bishops for a town in Bithynia, the commissioners added that "whatever was fitting for the see of Constantinople, with regard to consecrations within the provinces, should be considered in due order at the Council."  The Roman envoys were present so that they and any Eastern prelates interested had fair warning.  There was nothing like stealing a march or springing a mine. When,
at the close of the next day's session, Aetius, the archdeacon of Constantinople, announced that his Church had some business to bring forward, the commissioners "directed the Council to examine it" without their presence,  but the "legates" said that "they had no instructions about such a matter." Their game (if such a phrase may be used) was obvious: they wanted to avoid being outvoted, and afterwards to come in and protest against what might have been resolved upon in their absence; but as Mr. Rivington says, "it turned out that they had also received orders from Rome to oppose any attempt at altering the relations of bishops on the ground of the civil status of their sees" (p. 442). He means that on the next day, a "legate," on being challenged, produced some instructions from Leo to that effect.  Their former reply, then, was a falsehood which had served its purpose. However, the Council could not have its action stopped by the withdrawal
of those who professed to be its presidents; and the canon ranked as twenty-eighth was passed in a form which afterwards received a not unimportant modification. Unquestionably, there was more of ingeniousness than of ingenuousness in the wording, which endeavoured to make the newly sanctioned patriarchal jurisdiction in the "Asiatic," Pontic, and Thracian dioeceses (i.e. groups of provinces), a logical consequence of the precedency conferred on Constantinople in 381.  We are not concerned to defend, as a complete statement of the facts, the assertion that "the fathers with good reason assigned its privileges to the see of Old Rome, because that city was imperial," although undoubtedly it was a main element in the case.  Nor is it our business to hold a brief for the see of the Eastern capital; its prelates and clergy were just as open to the temptation of self-aggrandisement as those of Rome; but three points must it, fairness be remembered. First, between 381 and 451 Constantinople had been practically allowed in several cases to exercise authority in Asia; secondly, the ninth and seventeenth canons of this very Council had allowed an
appeal from primates  in Asia Minor to "the see of Constantinople;" thirdly, "Rome herself," in Tillemont's phrase, was probably "a cause of this canon which she opposed so strongly," for some dissatisfaction at "the legates' presidency" appears to have been exhibited in the Council, and it may well be "that the Easterns were glad to augment the power of Constantinople, as being most likely to hinder that of Rome from raising itself higher and higher;"  so that thus "the canons passed with the consent even of the principal bishops of Asia" - including those of Antioch and Jerusalem, and a number of metropolitans, with the deputy of him of Heraclea, - and several bishops present abstained from voting, but apparently did not oppose.  Next day both commissioners
and legates reappeared: the former asked for an explanation of what was said to have been done. The new canon was accordingly read, whereupon one "legate," with a truly Roman intrepidity of assertion as to what had taken place in his absence, affirmed that the signatures had been given under constraint. It does not in the least surprise one that, in spite of the evidence that "the bishops exclaimed, 'No one was forced,'" that the commissioners expressly asked the "Asian and Pontic" signataries whether they had signed of their own free will, that thirteen successively replied in the affirmative, and that "the rest exclaimed, 'We signed voluntarily,'" Mr. Rivington (without evidence) restricts the disclaimer of coercion to "some few," thinks the assertion of the legate "probable," and gravely adduces in its favour the "fearless" assertion of Leo to the same effect (pp. 443, 447), as if Leo would hesitate about repeating "fearlessly" whatever his legates reported to him on such a matter.  But now see how Mr. Rivington deals
with the Acts when they speak of a reading of certain earlier canons. "The legates read the sixth canon of Nicaea, ... quoted the sixth Nicene canon, beginning, 'Rome has always held the primacy'  (pp. 443 ff). Here, let us remark in passing, it is clearly intended to prepossess the reader in favour of the genuineness of what they read. But "Aetius is then supposed to have read first a slightly different version of the same canon, and then the third of Constantinople." (It was not Aetius, but Constantine, an imperial secretary, to whom Aetius had handed the codex.) "But this is in the highest degree improbable," because the Nicene canonp could not throw light on the claims of the see of Constantinople, which was then only the see of Byzantium, and the Church of Constantinople now relied on the third canon of Constantinople,
the Nicene canon being its "difficulty."  But if it was ad rem for a legate to quote his version of a Nicene canon, why was it irrelevant for a Constantinopolitan to read its Greek text? Then as to the "slight difference": Mr. Rivington does not give the Latin version here in parallelism with the Greek; but he more than suggests (as he had done before) that the Latin represents the true text, and therefore that the Greek was at least erroneous. He relies on a subsequent speech by the "commissioners," that they "perceived that by the canons the first place (ta prwteia) and distinguished honour were
reserved for the archbishop of Old Rome."  But so they were, in effect, by the third canon of Constantinople; and the commissioners at once go on, "but that the archbishop of New Rome ought to enjoy the same privileges of honour" (meaning, ought to rank next to the bishop of Rome, and before all others); and they propose some changes in the wording of the canon, intended to safeguard the rights of local Churches. But enough has been already said about the false Latin version; and one is past being surprised at finding that "the legates' protest," at the end of the proceedings, is given (p. 446) without the commissioners' humiliating rebuff: "All that we have proposed  has been sanctioned by the whole Council."
Yet the letter of the Council to Leo is claimed by Mr. Rivington as recognising to the full his universal supremacy, and therefore as nullifying "the Anglican interpretation" of the canon
which was thus enacted in the teeth of his envoys' protest. Now, first, the canon must be taken in its grammatical sense, and not explained away on the score of any expressions in the letter. Then look at the expressions:  the bishops call Leo their "head," because by his legates he was their president, and, as first among bishops, might fairly be addressed as their "father."  He had "held the position of interpreting the words of blessed Peter," inasmuch as they had accepted his Tome expressly on the ground that it truly represented the purport of Matt. xvi. 16; and by publicly affirming the true faith they had "used him as an originator of what was good." "To him had been committed by the Saviour the guardianship of the Vine": to him conspicuously and eminently, as holding a primary place, but certainly not in a sense generically unique; for they themselves had "received authority both to root up and to plant, and they treated the "definition" as their own. They requested him to "honour the decision by adding his own vote" (yhfois), and so to "confirm and assent to " what had been
done by "the Oecumenical Council" and, as they do not shrink from adding, "under the guidance of a Divine command"; and accordingly they "make known to him the whole purport (dunamin) of their proceedings."  Our author has thus exaggerated in the Papal interest the force of language which is otherwise sufficiently explained, especially by the light of acts which say more than words. Mr. Rivington himself would not deny that Oriental fluency of "compliment" appears in that curious passage which assumes that the legates only resisted the new canon that Leo might have the pleasure of approving it. Was it not also intelligible and inevitable that Leo, as president, should be asked to confirm a canon which, although it did not interfere with his own patriarchate or with Western Church administration, and therefore had no relation to Western Church law, did expressly mention his see, and expressly assign a cause for the "privileges" which had been
"given" to it? Then as to Anatolius' letter: it says that the Council was summoned to "confirm the faith of the fathers and the letter of Leo;"  but Mr. Rivington himself knows how to put different senses on "confirming," and the synod had met, by imperial order, to secure the right faith, of which Anatolius could truly say that Leo's letter was in full "accord" with it. But we have seen in the Acts of the Council an essential difference between the treatment of the Creed and the treatment of the Tome; and if, as Anatolius says, the bishops "laid on the altar their definition drafted for the confirmation of the fathers' faith, in accordance with" the Tome, he means that the Tome was solemnly approved as a true expression of that faith. Anatolius quotes the authoritative statement of the commissioners, that "the oros" (meaning here the Canon) "of the holy Council  was established and it is honoris gratia, as the Latin version puts it, that Leo is requested to give it his "approval and confirmation." And, lastly, as to Leo's letter on the subject, Mr. Rivington had formerly made him by implication the Church's "Emperor;" he now explicitly makes him the Church's
"King,"  but he will not admit what is implied in the particular line of objection which Leo through several letters  takes up and maintains. No doubt, in these "majestic and tender" epistles, he reiterates such dulcet terms as ambitionis spiritus, improbi desiderii, illicito appetitu, praesumptio, intemperanti cupiditati, prava cupiditas, vanitatis elatio. But although his real motive may be discerned through this copious vituperation, and although he professes to "annul it by the authority of Peter," he never takes up a properly Papal ground of objection as to its merits:  he poses, throughout,
as the champion of Nicene rules, as guarding the interest of Alexandria and Antioch, of the privileges or "primacies of provinces," and of metropolitical sees.  Being a statesman, and, so far, a diplomatist, and having to address, not his own Western, but an Eastern Emperor and Eastern ecclesiastics, he forbears to rest on the Papal claim as such, and falls back on the lower but safer line which might have been taken up by an Egyptian or Syrian prelate who looked with jealousy on Constantinople.  The inference is too obvious
to need statement; nor need we dwell on the fact stated by Tillemont after Liberatus, that "Ce canon subsista et fut exécuté, malgré l'opposition de S. Leon et de ses successeurs, parceque les empereurs l'appuyoient. 
 Mansi, vi. 817. The monk Constantine's account is set aside by Mr. Rivington, because he was "convicted of untrustworthiness." But it would have been as well to say what the "account" was. This pertinacious advocate of Entyches still thought fit to represent him as having appealed, not only to these three "synods," but also to that of Thessalonica (Mansi, vi. 817). But we may take it as certain that he made no formal appeal whatever during the council.
 Mansi, vi. 641. This was said at the Latrocinium. Eutyches, as Mr. Rivington says, told "a falsehood" when he professed to have formally appealed to Leo; but the point of interest is that be represented himself as having appealed to several authorities. In an age of hierarchical solidarity, the help of any great see might be invoked by a sufferer; and so, apparently, Flavian, at the Latrocinium, appealed to Leo (Ep. 43).
 Leon. Ep. 26. The first letter is Ep. 22. Leo had not received it when he wrote Ep. 23, Feb. 18, 449. On May 21 he acknowledged receipt of Flavian's letters (Ep. 27).
 Literally, to vote with, sumyhfisasqai. The Latin has "suffragari."
 If Theodosius had recognised Leo's see as "the supreme court of appeal," he would not have entertained and acted on this scheme in spite of Leo's objections.
 Ep. 33. Theodosius had not implied, as Leo chooses to suppose, that he desired to get an exposition of Peter's confession "from Peter himself," i.e. from his see. This (as we have already seen) was a Roman usus loquendi.
 A great man, being also first among bishops, and Roman patriarch, with the prestige of the "Petrine" tradition, would be quite strong enough for what Leo succeeded in doing. An acknowledged spiritual monarch, supreme alike in East and West, would have done more.
 See Canon Gore's Leo the Great, p. 99.
 Epp. 43 and 61. In quoting Ep. 44 Mr. Rivington makes Leo speak of the "faith which, inspired divinely, we have received," and claims this as "meaning exactly that divine assistance which constitutes papal infallibility according to the Vatican decree" (p. 387). He complacently remarks that the phrase, "if taken too strictly, goes beyond" that decree. But the Latin is "fidei quam divinitus inspiratam et accepimus et tenemus," i.e. the faith as originally communicated by God to the Church, and so handed down to Leo and to the "holy synod" in whose name he writes.
 It is the urgency of entreaty: "Obsecramus - supplicant" (Ep. 44. 2,3); "supplicationi nostrae" (Ep. 54. 2); and to Pulcheria, "obsecrantes ... supplicationem" (Ep. 45. 1,2. Ep. 54 was written after the others, but not, as Mr. Rivington says, in "January," 450; he has mistaken the Ballerini's date, oct. Kal. Jan = Dec. 25, 449.) As Bishop Andrewes says, "Audis jam hic mandatum nullum" (Tort. Torti, p. 196). Mr. Rivington hardly allows this to be observed by his readers.
 As for Valentinian's letter (Leon. Ep. 55) which, as Mr. Rivington truly says, "was inspired by Leo," it is a little too much to assume that Leo's religious "motive" could justify the claim that he should "judge about the faith and the bishops." Yet this is modified into a request for a general council in Italy.
 When Mr. Rivington says, "We knew that" Theodosius "had avowed the sovereignty of the see of St. Peter over all the sees of Christendom by his signature to the 'constitution' of Valentinian," re Hilary (p. 393), he forgets the imperial usus loquendi, which saved the principle of the unity of the empire by uniting the names of both emperors in the edicts of each. Cf. Marcian's letters, Leon. Epp. 100, 110 ("Valentinianus et Marcianus"), despatched in both names from Constantinople.
Leo had "obtained the 'constitution' from Valentinian, who was then at Rome" (Tillemont, xv. 83), and it was sent off to Aetius, then ruling in Gaul. Theodosius' own conduct shows that he could not have committed himself to the "constitution," or acknowledged it as binding in the East.
 Gibbon, vi. 27.
 Ep. 73. Episkopeuousan kai arxousan ths qeias pistews. This cannot mean that Leo was the "ruler of the faith," but that, as chief Christian bishop, he was that faith's foremost guardian.
 The same phrase is used by Pulcheria in Ep. 77; Mr. Rivington quotes it (p. 392) and glosses the very next word, oriswsin (i.e. the bishops), as if Leo were to decide everything by his legates "in the council."
 Ep. 69. In Ep. 70, "I ask that he will assent to Cyril's letter to Nestorius - ... vel epistolae meae," etc. The Ballerini (naturally, from their standpoint) argue that vel here = et. But even taking it so, Cyril's letter and the tome are put side by side; both are to be "heedfully considered." Is this like "dealing with the archbishop of Constantinople as a subject, and imposing on him the Roman 'form of faith'"? (p. 395). The circumstances fully account for the letter (of a year later) about two of Anatolius' priests, who had visited Rome and satisfied Leo of their orthodoxy (Ep. 87). But Mr. Rivington, in p. 397, italicises a phrase in this letter, "by the teaching of the Holy Spirit," as if Leo could not ascribe what "he had learned and taught" to that Divine "instruction" without assuming to be the infallible teacher of all Christians. Cf. Leo, Ep. 120, from which Mr. Rivington (p. 415) quotes some words on the contents of the tome as being "what God had previously defined by his ministry;" bet further on Leo explains this by referring to the Scriptural authorities "brought together in it," as rendering "further doubt" impossible. Leo also says twice that the council, by its assent, "strengthened" the tome; but Mr. Rivington is not satisfied without inserting "further" and glossing, "It was already of faith."
 Mr. Rivington thinks Marcian a signally "holy" emperor. He was, at any rate, a very "capable" one. See, e.g. Bury's Later Roman Empire, i. 135.
 Rivington, p. 396.
 See Mansi, vi. 581.
 E.g. in the third citation (Mansi, vi. 1036).
 If it did, then one might say that the council declared itself to be composed of angels; for three of these effusive memorialists address the council as "your angelical company" (Mansi, vi. 1009, etc.; as does one of the bishops, ib. 1063). This sort of complimenting was not exclusively Eastern: Leo himself dues not shrink from ascribing to emperors a "sacerdotal energy" and "a sacerdotal mind" (Epp. 24, 115, 155).
Mr. Rivington's phrase, "The term 'universal bishop' ... was freely used at the council of Chalcedon" (p. 438), would mislead an unwary reader.
[These Alexandrian petitions were treated by Pope Gregory I. (Epp. 18, 20, 43) as if the Council of Chalcedon had offered the title "Universal bishop" to Leo. True, Gregory then calls this epithet frivolous and refuses to bear it, as something robbing other bishops of the honour due to them. - NF]
 Mansi, vi. 1048 ff. The vote of the "legates" speaking first is assumed by Mr. Rivington to be the "sentence" of the Council (p. 405). In this he is following the Ballerini. True, the legates, as presiding, had repeatedly asked the council what was its mind as to the penalty merited by Dioscorus, and the council had replied that the penalty prescribed by "the canons" should be inflicted (Mansi, vi. 1044). One Lydian bishop remarked that Dioscorus had been "the first to give judgment" when he presided at Ephesus (at the Latrocinium), and requested the legates, as now presiding, to "pronounce" according to the canons, adding that the whole council was sumyhfos with them, a phrase repeated by the bishop of Antioch. Then the legates made their speech, which Tillemont calls their "avis." If it was the synodical sentence, why did it conclude with "the synod yhfisetai according to the canons"? and why was it followed by a series of episcopal pronouncements, among which the verbs "decide" or "define" occur some thirty times, and the verb "judge" over seventy, besides such terms as "I condemn" or "I exclude," or "I assent to the judgment pronounced by the fathers" (i.e. the leading bishops), etc.? Where "I think" occurs, it involves a judicial opinion or finding. In the subsequent signatures two of the three legates, speaking as such, profess to "define" (decide) "together with the synod;" and three great prelates, speaking next, use the same phrase without alluding to Rome.
 Mansi vi. 1096, 1097. E.g. Para ths ... sunodou kaqareisqai. Twenty-eight refer to his refusal to plead; three to his conduct re Eutyches and Flavian.
 Mansi, vi. 1099. He is also twice in this context called "archbishop," a title which, like "pope," was applied by the Easterns to occupants of pre-eminent sees. In the deposition votes it is repeatedly given both to Leo and to Anatoliue; and also once to the bishop of Thessalonica. In the votes as to the tome, one bishop in the same sentence prefixes "pope" both to Leo and to Cyril (Mansi, vii. 21). In fact, this title had in the East a special applicability to the bishop of Alexandria.
 Mansi, vi. 1099. Because the council tells Pulcheria that "Christ had used Leo as champion of the truth, as of old He used Peter," therefore, according to Mr. Rivington's logic, the council declares Leo to be "the vicar of Christ in his direction of the Church - a statement which is correctly summed up in the more modern phrase, 'papal supremacy' or 'infallibility'" (p. 408): Q.E.D.! In one passage, Mr. Rivington ventures to say that "the invalidity of the Robber-synod was assigned by the bishops simply and solely to the decision of the bishop of Rome" (p. 435), as if it did not result from the proceedings re Dioscorus. See Mansi, vi. 936.
 See this "rule" in Mansi, iv. 1361. For its purport, I may refer to my Notes on the Canons, etc., p. 533. Pistis = a creed.
 Mansi, vi. 953.
 Anatolius and a synod had done so in the autumn of 450 (Leon. Ep. 77). Others signed later.
 Leo expressly distinguishes it from the creed (Ep. 165. 10). In the preceding discussion at Ephesus, "exposition" had been repeatedly used as meaning "creed." Mr. Rivington is doubly wrong when he says, "It was (they said) Leo's sentence ... which made it unnecessary." Not "unnecessary," but "unlawful;" and not because of "Leo's sentence," but of o kanwn.
 Mansi, iv. 1140 ff.
 Rivington, pp. 397, 415. He assumes that "no orthodox Christian could" then "seriously maintain that any of the bishops were free to revise that dogmatic letter" (p. 416).
 Mansi, vii. 9 ff. The last affirmation is by a bishop from Pontus (ib. 24).
 Mr. Rivington rightly observes that the acclamation, "Peter hath spoken [thus] by Leo" meant "that as a matter of fact he was true to the Apostle's teaching." Yet he adds, "but their exclamation suggests their belief that it followed frmn his official position" (p. 412). Rather, that he himself had spoken in a manner worthy of that position. Against this Roman convert of a few years' standing, who insists that the council had no option as to accepting the tome, one may set a pope, Vigilius, quoted in "Waymarks in Church History," etc., p. 229. As Bossuet says (Def. Decl. Cler. Gall. vii. 17), "placuit Leonis epistolam ad legitimum concilii examen revocare," and he couples "examen" with "inquisitio" and "judicium," meaning that the bishops recorded the result of such "examen," that they had previously satisfied themselves of the soundness of the tome. There is no parallel between this and Leo's offer in 458 to send clerics to explain the Chalcedonian teaching (Ep. 162.3); for in the same letter, as elsewhere, he insists that this teaching is not open to revision; whereas it is the merest petitio principii to assume that his tome was in that position before the "examen."
 The speech of the legates is partly corrupt; but Mr. Rivington has misrepresented it. They do not "describe the attitude of the synod towards the tome of Leo as being precisely the same as their attitude towards the council of Nice and the council of Ephesus" (p. 414). On the contrary, they ground the claim of the tome to acceptance on its agreement with the two forms of the creed and with the Cyrilline-Ephesine dogma (Ideoque - kai toutou xarin , Mansi, vii. 11). That is, just when, on Mr. Riviogton's showing, they ought to have proclaimed, in such language as was appropriate to their time, the principle of papal infallibility, they, speaking for Leo, take up quite different ground. Mr. Rivington says of that principle, "the thing was there" (p. 417). It was not there; it was conspicuous by its absence. Something else was there instead.
 Mr. Rivington tries to produce an effect by a free use of the phrases, "the Holy See," "His Holiness," etc. Thus, in p. 337, "Most Holy Father" appears with three initial capitals, while "fellow-minister" is not so distinguished, and might almost escape the eye. In two of the passages quoted in pp. 353, 354, "your Holiness" is substituted for the original "your piety," a common title of all bishops, as indeed was "your holiness." These are little matters, but worth noting we see what is aimed at.
 Therefore add to the definition," etc. Mansi, vii. 105. See Leo, Ep. 28 (the tome), c. 3, and "in both natures," c. 5.
 "With which letter [of Cyril] the council has reasonably combined the letter of ... archbishop Leo," etc. Mansi, vii. 113. Routh, Scr. Opusc. ii. 78.
 Mansi, vii. 465 (elegxetwsan). Marcian is asked to "confirm by the synod the teaching of the see of Peter;" and sixteen passages from fathers are added, in defence of its theology from the charge of "innovation." Yet, according to Mr. Rivington, it was de fide from the first! This address Hefele refers to the fifth session, in which the "Definitio" was adopted.
 He had written, "Theodoret ... [in Ep. 113] enumerates the advantages with which the apostolic throne is adorned, viz. 'abundance of spiritual gifts as compared with others, superabundant splendour, the presidency over the whole world, abundance of subjects, present rule, and the communication of her name to her subjects'" (p. 427). Now, Theodoret (whose original is referred to in footnotes), after speaking of the "advantages," goes on to speak of the city of Rome, and attributes to it "an abundance of good things, for it is the greatest of all, presides over the whole world, swells with a multitude of inhabitants, has developed an existing sovereignty, communicates its name to its subjects," but is "chiefly adorned by its faith, and by the tombs of Peter and Paul." He then reverts to the "see," as made most conspicuous by these apostles - as their see, - as having acquired a new "splendour" through the orthodox zeal of Leo himself. This gross perversion of Theodoret's language was pointed out, and has since been included in the list of corrigenda; but how? - simply by reading "is adorned. Rome has 'abundance,'" etc. Any reader might infer that "Rome" meant "the apostolic throne," which has been mentioned just before. Is this an adequate effatement of such a blot? In p. 33, "Theodoret uses prokaqhmenh ths oikoumenhs of the holy see" is now corrected by "deleting" the last four words.
 In this letter the Roman see is said to have "on many accounts the presidency, thn hgemonian, over all churches." Mr. Rivington mistranslates this by his favourite "sovereignty," and does not appreciate the significance of the chief reason assigned - the fidelity of its occupants to the truth.
 Tois en ekeinh, Ep. 119. Tillemont says, "Although Theodoret, in writing to the pope, speaks as if he had addressed him alone, we see that it was from the bishops of the West in general that he awaited the decision of his cause" (xv. 294). The letter to Florentius (Ep. 117) is considered by Tillemont to be a circular to these bishops.
 See Tillemont, xv. 308.
 Mansi, vi. 589; vii. 188.
 Maximus said he had "from the first known Theodoret to be orthodox - because he had heard his preaching" (Mansi, vii. 192). Mr. Rivington pleads that the council was here simply acting under commission from Leo; but Ep. 93. 2, to which he refers, merely exhorts the council to "heal the wounds" caused by the unjust ejection of orthodox bishops. And the council had not "exclaimed" that Leo had "judged with God," until its own demand had been complied with.
 Mansi, vii. 189 ff. Two other cases may be touched on in a note. Domnus of Antioch had been deposed at the Latrocininm, and Maximus had been consecrated in his place. If all the Latrocinian acts were invalidated, Maximus could not he bishop of Antioch; but Leo had pronounced in his favour, and Mr. Rivington holds that this pronouncement was the sole ground on which Maximus was recognised at Chalcedon, and that the case "covers everything ever claimed by the holy see in the way of jurisdiction," so that in recognising Maximus the council admitted that "the government of the Church was strictly and properly papal" (p. 434). But Maximus had already approved himself orthodox by circulars "throughout his provinces" (Leo, Ep. 88. 3); so that the council, in accepting him from the outset as bishop of Antioch, had not merely Leo's act to rest upon; and in the tenth session Stephen of Ephesus spoke of his appointment as originally "canonical," on the ground, apparently, that Domnus had waived his own rights (Mansi, vii. 260). As for Jnvenal of Jerusalem, the approval of a compromise between him and Maximus, about jurisdictions, was the act of the council itself, in the seventh session. The salvo by which, according to Mr. Rivington, Maximus referred to Leo's sanction as necessary to validate the arrangement, is not in the Greek acts (Mansi, vii. 18o), but only in a manuscript "edited by the Ballerini" (p. 436); and the legates' speech, even as there given, ignores it (cf. Migne's Leo, ii. col. 731); nor does Leo mention it in his letter of 453. Mr. Rivington applies his words "in hac sollicitudine" to that question; but Leo is speaking of the maintenance of the faiths ("ne quid sibi haeretica pravitas audeat vindicare"), and it is immediately afterwards that he urges Maximus to uphold the "privileges" of Antioch, and to "consult" with him for that end. He is writing two years after the council (a point overlooked by our author); and he does not speak as he must have spoken if such a salvo had been referred to him; he only says that he has not sanctioned any act of his legates on matters not doctrinal. He does mention Juvenal's earlier "attempts" made in 431 (Ep. 119. 4). The salvo, then, may be dismissed as a clumsy Roman invention.
 Carm. de seipso et de episcopis, 799. He has just said, Qronous men oun exoite kai turannidas. In Orat. 42.23 he uses "patriarchs" for senior bishops. At Chalcedon the commissioners extend it to all primates or exarchs (Mansi, vi. 953).
 Mansi, vii. 92. The sunodos endhmousa grew up out of natural relations between the bishop of Constantinople and bishops visiting that capital on their own church affairs.
 Mansi, vii. 313.
 Anatolius told Leo that he had "often informed them about this very matter" (Leon. Ep. 101. 5).
 Mr. Rivington's statement that they "refused" to attend (p. 442) gives a very false impression. Contrast Hefele: "The commissioners themselves had requested the synod to take in hand the discussion of the privileges of the see of Constantinople (iii. 385, E.T.). He ascribes their absence to "prudential considerations" in view of their judicial position.
 Mansi, vii. 443.
 Cf. Bright, Notes on the Canons, p. 222.
 Cp. Salmon, Infallibility of the Church, p. 370.
 We have already seen a brilliant specimen of papal exegesis in regard to the ninth canon (p. 79).
 Tillemont, xv. 710. Mr. Rivington calls a statement to this effect "strange" when made by Mr. Gore, who, however, was simply following Tillemont. But we know what papalists think of the great Gallican. As Tillemont fairly remarks, Ephesus was vacant, and the primate of Pontus and the metropolitan of Galatia did not sign. But it appeared afterwards that they felt no strong objection (Mansi, vii. 449 ff.).
 The number of signataries present was short of 200, but three metropolitans profess to sign also for twenty-three suffragans. As Mr. Rivington remarks (p. 441), many bishops had left Chaleedon. It is observable that Theodoret signed.
 "Extortis assentationibus," Ep. 114.2; cf. Ep. i06.3. Mr. Rivington, as we have seen, had already lauded Leo's "accuracy." This very accurate pontiff informed Anatolius (Ep. 106.5), that the third canon of Constantinople had "long ago collapsed." "He could have known but little of what had taken place in the East" (Tillemont, xv. 701). Wishes were apt to make facts for Leo. See above, as to the Sardican canon being quoted as "Nicene," and the "constitution" of Valentinian. Again, the Acts represent the legates, in their speech re Dioscorus, as calling Leo "pope" and "archbishop of the great and elder Rome." Leo himself, in 452, writing to the Gallie bishops, and professing to give the legates' words, makes them describe him not only as "papa," but as "caput universalis ecclesiae" (Ep. 103), a phrase which, to say the least, looks very like a papal addition to words used at Chalcedon. It may have been what the legates reported to Leo; but he would see no harm in "correcting defects" in their language.
 This commencement is called by Van Espen the character specialissimus of the Roman codex of the canons (Opp. iii. 14, ed. 1753). The version read by one of the legates is that which has been termed "antiquissima," but which, as we have seen, is at variance on this important point with two older Latin versions. The so-called "Prisca" verbally modifies it by introducing the reference to "ancient custom." See "Additional Note" at the end.
 So in p. 171: "The occurrence of this sixth canon in what the archdeacon of Constantinople is supposed to have read is probably due to the copyists." Here, no doubt, Mr. Rivington follows Hefele and the Ballerini. But if the legates' version of the canon was alone read, then the Greek text was practically thrown overboard by the church of Constantinople at the very moment at which its exhibition would have been necessary in order to prove that it was the text. It would he more consistent to suppose, as Mr. Rivington does, but as Hefele does not, that the "Greek text" was spurious; but that view is against Greek authorities and the best Latin versions. The minutes contain no remark as to the discrepancy; but "silence" in such a case would be both courteous and "expressive."
 This was to conciliate the "legates:" and apart from all question about canons, Rome's position as the "first" see was undisputed and indisputable.
 Dielalhsamen, interlocuti sumus. Hefele explains, "The prerogative assigned to the church of Constantinople is, in spite of the opposition of the Roman legate, decreed by the synod" (not, as Mr. Rivington says, by a "little knot of bishops"). Panta is evidently a mistake for pasa - see the Latin version (Mansi, vii. 454). Presbeia is here explained by ths timhs.
 Leon. Ep. 98.
 Suffragans, in presenting a bishop-elect to the metropolitan for consecration, are required by our ordinal to address him as "father."
 Pasan umin twn pepragmenwn thn dunamin egnwrisamen eis ... bebaiwsin te kai sugkataqesin. Anatolius, no doubt, did say what the council did not say, that "all the force and confirmation of what was done was reserved for the authority" of Leo (Mr. Rivington has "corrected" the mistake of attributing this language to the council, p. 454); but, as our author puts it, he said it "later on" (p. 457). Yes, more than two years later (Leon. Ep. 132. 4), and when he had a point to gain.
 Leon. Ep. 101.1
 He charges the legates with "disturbing the synod."
 "As it is the duty of a king ... so Leo" (p. 460). One sees why Mr. Rivington is so careful to speak ancient "popes" as "reigning" (cf. pp. 175, 185, 201, 215).
 See Epp. 104-106, etc.
 Mr. Rivington notices this objection on p. 182 (where, however, the third canon of Constantinople seems to be named by oversight for the twenty-eighth of Chalcedon), and meets it by one of his facile assumptions. Canons "were not a hyperpapal power, ruling the popes themselves, for they acquired their force from the popes."
Then come two illustrations: (1) A king is bound to respect the laws - "not because they are superior to him, but because he is bound by the natural and divine law to set the example." Has submission to ecclesiastical absolutism made Mr. Rivington forget the traditions, the basal ideas, of kingship as understood by Englishmen? He may consult a Roman Catholic historian: it was part of Richard II.'s despotic policy to "place himself above the control of the law" (Lingard, H. Engl. iv. 255; cf. "K. Rich. II." ii.1, "Thy state of law is bondslave to the law"). (2) The relation of pope to canons is compared with that of Roman emperors to law: i.e, the pope is more than the king, he is the autocrat, of the Church! (So, indeed, Vaticanism makes him; see Mr. Gladstone's Rome and the Newest Fashions in Religion, p. 99.) But in this case Leo keeps his supposed kingship, or emperorship, in the background. By the way, if the pope has this position, how can Mr. Rivington venture to say that for Sylvester to have "sent an authoritative utterance," imposing "the Homoousios" (usually spoken of as "Homoousion") on the East, as "a condition of Catholic communion," would have been the "'despotic' method" (p. 158)? It would have been strictly within the terms of the Vatican decree.
 Epp. 104, 105, 106.
 A bishop (Eusebius) assured the council of Chalcedon that, when at Rome, he had read the third canon of Constantinople to Leo, who had approved of it (Mansi, vii. 449). "It is not easy," says Tillemont, "to harmonise this with what St. Leo afterwards asserted, that the Roman church had never given its approval to this canon" (xv. 618). The bishop (who was an impetuous person) most likely misunderstood Leo's silence, pretty much as Mr. Rivington has misconstrued the silence of Easterns in certain circumstances. In the very first session of Chalcedon the legates had recognised Anatolius as ranking next to Leo (Mansi, vi. 607).
 Liberatus, Brev. c. 13, says, "And although the apostolic see even now contradicts, quod a synodo firmatum est imperatoris patrocinio permanet quoque modo;" cp. Tillemont, xv. 715, 730; so also Hefele says (iii. 446), that the Greeks, although for a time they "seemed" to yield, ultimately secured what the Canon gave them, and reaffirmed the canon at the council "in Trullo" (c. 361). At last even the fourth council of Lateran, professing to "renew the ancient privileges of patriarchal sees," recognised Constantinople (then in Latin hands) as ranking second after Rome as supreme (Mansi, xxii. 989).